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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, CLIENT 
CONFESSIONS AND WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS: IMMUNITY AS A STATUTORY 
SOLUTION 
Richard E. Myers II† 
Attorneys face a serious personal dilemma when a client 
confesses that he or she committed the crime for which 
someone else has been wrongfully convicted.  If they do 
nothing, a wrongful conviction stands.  If they come forward, 
their client faces the prospect of a new criminal conviction. 
Professional ethics require them to maintain all privileges and 
may lead them to counsel their client to remain silent, 
notwithstanding manifest injustice.  This Essay proposes a 
statutory solution: states should create a procedure for in 
camera, ex parte review of the confession by the judge in the 
court of conviction or appropriate appellate body.  In cases 
where the confession is sufficiently credible, the court would 
authorize immunity for the confessing client and forward the 
confession to the convicted individual’s counsel to be used in 
motions for appropriate relief. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many people are familiar with Alton Logan’s case, even if 
they don’t know him by name.  Logan is the Chicago man who 
was wrongfully convicted of having killed a McDonald’s 
security guard in 1982, and then spent twenty-six years in 
prison while the real killer’s lawyers kept an affidavit from their 
client confessing to the crime sealed in a box, at times under 
one lawyer’s bed.1  Those attorneys, Chicago public defenders 
Dale Coventry and Jamie Kunz, admitted to having their 
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consciences torn constantly by the choice they had to make 
between a professional ethic that required them to protect their 
murderous client’s secret and their personal concern for the 
wrongfully convicted Logan.2  In an interview with CBS news 
program 60 Minutes, Coventry was asked whether the 
attorneys should have come forward, despite the ethical rules. 
He said: 
Well, the vast majority of the public apparently believes 
that, but if you check with attorneys or ethics committees[,] 
or you know[,] anybody who knows the rules of conduct for 
attorneys, it’s very, very—it’s not morally clear—but we’re in 
a position to where we have to maintain client 
confidentiality, just as a priest would or a doctor would.  It’s 
just a requirement of the law.  The system wouldn’t work 
without it.3 
Coventry and Kunz did come forward after their client’s death, 
with his permission, and the affidavit they ultimately produced 
helped exonerate Logan. 
Should an attorney whose client has credibly confessed to 
having committed a murder or other serious crime for which 
someone else has been wrongfully convicted be required to 
keep that secret?4  Should the attorney be allowed to?  Almost 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
 4 For a thoughtful discussion of the answer to the question under current 
law, see James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer 
Reveal Her Client’s Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another?, 38 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811 (2011).  See also Inbal Hasbani, Comment, When the 
Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by A Wrongful Incarceration Exception to 
Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 297–98 (2010) 
(“In order to avoid the Fifth Amendment constitutional violations triggered by an 
attorney’s disclosure of a wrongful incarceration, use immunity should be offered 
as a corollary right under a wrongful incarceration exception.”); Jean Fleming 
Powers, Comparing Exceptions to Privilege and Confidentiality Relating to Crime, 
Fraud, and Harm—Can Hard Cases Make Good Law?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 61, 80–
82 (2010) (arguing that adding an exception to allow for an attorney to come 
forward with their client’s information to free a person from wrongful 
incarceration is consistent with other exceptions to the rule of confidentiality and 
“the importance placed on liberty in this country”); Lloyd B. Snyder, Is 
Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 479 
(2002) (arguing that the organized bar should “defer to the courts in establishing 
disclosure standards for client information on a case by case basis”); Ken Strutin, 
Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another’s Innocence: A 
Systemic Approach, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 499, 556–60 (2011) (proposing a 
“transactional immunity” approach to resolving the tension between 
incriminating evidence and the attorney-client privilege); Harry I. Subin, The 
Lawyer As Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. 
REV. 1091, 1129 (1985) (“If the incrimination rationale were the law, the 
attorney-client privilege, which contains a host of qualifications—including, of 
course, the crime or fraud exception—would be converted into a constitutionally 
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every criminal defense attorney I have asked has said yes to 
both questions—the secret should be kept because of the value 
of the attorney-client privilege and because it is enshrined in 
state versions of American Bar Association Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.6.5  Every non-lawyer6 to whom I have 
asked the same questions has said no to being required to keep 
the secret, because of the horrors of wrongfully convicting an 
innocent person.  Given the client-confidentiality 
considerations, there has been a split to the answer on when 
they should be allowed to keep it.  This divergence between 
legal ethics and lay intuitions of right and wrong is troubling. 
This Essay offers a way out of the dilemma. 
I propose that states make it possible for attorneys to come 
mandated absolute rule.”). 
 5 Most states have adopted some version of the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rule on the attorney-client confidentiality as part of their ethical rules 
governing lawyers’ conduct.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2018). 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result
or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these
Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s
representation of the client;
(6) to comply with other law or a court order; or
(7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the
lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the composition
or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would
not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice
the client.
(c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access
to, information relating to the representation of a client.
 6 Asking friends and acquaintances is an admittedly unscientific method of 
testing social attitudes.  I would expect notice and comment procedures before 
the appropriate state bodies made any changes to the ethical rules or new 
legislation. 
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forward by legislation.  Once their client has credibly confessed 
to them that the client, not the convicted person, committed a 
crime, they could follow a set of procedures designed to create 
a path to immunity for the client in exchange for passing the 
information on to the criminal justice system to remedy the 
wrongful conviction.  The same statute that created the 
immunity path would create an exception to the attorney-client 
privilege to make it possible for the attorney to come forward, 
with or without the client’s permission.  In addition, the bar 
association would create exemptions to the client 
confidentiality rules to permit the lawyer to come forward 
within the ethical rules.  Finally, the statute would have to 
create a procedure for the information to be judicially tested in 
private and for a judge to decide whether to grant immunity. 
Under my proposal, the convicted person would have to be 
factually innocent—a term of art I explain in greater detail 
below.  There are at least five important choices that need to 
be made before any proposal is enacted.  1) Who reports, and 
under what conditions?  2) How is the information provided to 
the criminal justice system?  3) On what basis will immunity 
be provided?  By whom, and with whose input?  4) Will the 
confessing client receive use immunity or transactional 
immunity?  How will this grant of immunity impact the 
separation of powers inherent in the independent exercise of 
the prosecutorial function?  5) Will the new rule apply to all 
wrongfully convicted individuals or a subset?  If a subset, how 
is the subset defined? 
This is a complex set of changes that requires some careful 
drafting.  As a first pass on the issue, I offer the following 
proposal, which makes some of the necessary choices.  A state 
could adopt a version of these statutory additions and 
amendments to their attorney-client privilege and lawyer-client 
confidentiality rules: 
First, attorneys who have a client who has credibly 
confessed to a felony for which they are aware a factually 
innocent person7 has been wrongfully convicted and sentenced 
to incarceration for a term of more than one year shall within 
 7 The factually innocent would presumably follow the provisions of the 
applicable law for a pardon of innocence in the controlling jurisdiction, although 
a definition could be added within any implementing legislation.  See, e.g., N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1460(1) (2016) (“‘Claim of factual innocence’ means a claim on 
behalf of a living person convicted of a felony in the General Court of Justice of 
the State of North Carolina, asserting the complete innocence of any criminal 
responsibility for the felony for which the person was convicted and for any other 
reduced level of criminal responsibility relating to the crime . . . .”). 
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30 days file an affidavit, under seal and ex parte, with the trial 
court in which the conviction occurred, detailing the 
confession and any supporting evidence. 
Second, the court, upon an in camera review and a finding 
that the evidence is sufficiently credible to call the conviction 
into doubt, shall grant use and derivative use immunity to the 
confessing client, provide the information to the convicted 
person’s defense counsel of record and the prosecution, and 
request that the parties initiate appropriate proceedings. 
Third, in the event that the trial court does not find that 
the evidence calls the conviction into doubt, the filing shall be 
retained under seal and the information may be not be 
disclosed for any other purpose without a grant of 
transactional immunity. 
Fourth, the information revealed may not be used in civil 
proceedings for money damages against the client whose 
confidentiality is at issue.  In the event of a perjurous 
confession, any grant of immunity will be rescinded, and the 
person or persons rendering the false confession will be 
prosecuted for obstruction of justice and perjury as 
appropriate.8  The state’s version of Rule 1.6(b)(1), or other 
ethical analogue to the attorney’s duty of confidentiality, would 
be amended to a modified version of the statement in the 
Massachusetts version of Rule 1.6 to permit disclosure, inter 
alia, “to prevent [or correct] the wrongful execution or 
incarceration of another.”9 
I 
A REAL-WORLD PROBLEM 
It is impossible to say as an empirical matter how often the 
 8 Other authors have considered some general notion of immunity for 
witnesses in wrongful conviction cases but propose solutions different from the 
one in this Essay.  See, e.g., Hasbani, supra note 4, at 297–98 (proposing a 
permissive structure where attorneys may come forward in cases of wrongful 
conviction); Powers, supra note 4, at 82 (arguing that adding an exception to allow 
for an attorney to come forward with their client’s information to free a person 
from wrongful incarceration is consistent with other exceptions to the rule of 
confidentiality and “the importance placed on liberty in this country”); Strutin, 
supra note 4 (surveying the pathways and analyses in assessing the propriety, 
necessity, and method of disclosure); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking 
Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 650 
(1990) (listing the hypothetical situation in the appendix). 
 9 See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2016) (“A lawyer may 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm; or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarceration of 
another.”). 
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problem will come up, but the Logan example, while famous, 
is not unique.  Similar cases from Arizona and North Carolina 
appear in the case reporters, and attorneys in both cases 
risked discipline to come forward to testify. 
A. Bill Macumber10
In Arizona, a man named Bill Macumber spent thirty-six
years in prison for a pair of murders he steadfastly denied 
committing.  The murders were committed in 1962.  Macumber 
was convicted in 1976, after the twelve-year-old case was 
reopened when his estranged ex-wife came forward to say he 
had confessed to the crimes.  At Macumber’s trial, a federal 
public defender named Thomas O’Toole offered to testify that 
his deceased client, Ernest Valenzuela, had confessed to the 
1962 murders in the course of preparing for a separate murder 
trial.  (Valenzuela had also confessed to the killings during an 
earlier arrest but was dismissed by police as a crank.) 
Valenzuela was killed in prison after his own murder 
conviction.  The trial court refused to let O’Toole testify in 
Macumber’s trial, citing concerns about the attorney-client 
privilege.  On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found no 
error in excluding O’Toole’s testimony, but reversed on other 
grounds.  However, one Justice concurring in the result would 
have allowed O’Toole to testify.  Noting that Valenzuela was 
dead and could not face criminal jeopardy, he stated: “When 
the interests are weighed, I believe that the constitutional right 
of the accused to present a defense should prevail over the 
property interest of a deceased client in keeping his disclosures 
private.  I would allow the defendant to offer the testimony of 
the attorneys concerning the confession of their deceased 
client.”11 
B. Lee Wayne Hunt
Similar circumstances occurred in the Lee Wayne Hunt
case in North Carolina.  There, a man named Jerry Cashwell 
confessed to his attorney that he acted alone when killing 
Roland and Lisa Matthews.  Lee Wayne Hunt was convicted of 
having acted with Cashwell in a separate murder trial. 
Cashwell’s attorney, Staples Hughes, testified at a hearing on 
Lee Wayne Hunt’s motion for a new trial that Cashwell had 
 10 For an account of Macumber’s conviction and release, see BARRY SIEGEL, 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE: THE TRUE STORY OF A CONVICTED MURDERER AND THE LAWYERS 
WHO FOUGHT FOR HIS FREEDOM (2013). 
 11 State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1088 (1976) (en banc) (Holohan, J., 
specially concurring). 
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confessed that he committed the murders for which Hunt had 
been convicted.12  The judge presiding over the hearing refused 
to consider Hughes’s testimony and referred Hughes to the 
state bar for discipline.13  The North Carolina State Bar 
ultimately dismissed the disciplinary proceeding. 
According to Professor James Moliterno, who has proposed 
that the ABA modify Model Rule 1.6 to permit these types of 
disclosures, “[c]onfidence in the justice system cannot long 
survive in the face of long-past revelations of wrongful 
convictions when silence was mandated by lawyer ethics 
law.”14  The public outrage following the 60 Minutes piece on 
the Logan case led to renewed interest in finding a way out of 
the ethical box. 
II 
THE PRIVILEGE NOW 
The classic formulation of the attorney-client privilege is 
embodied in section 502(b) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence: 
General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing a confidential communication made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client: 
(1) between the client or a representative of the
client and the client’s lawyer or a representative
of the lawyer;
(2) between the lawyer and a representative of the
lawyer;
(3) by the client or a representative of the client or
the client’s lawyer or a representative of the
lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer
representing another party in a pending action
and concerning a matter of common interest
therein;
(4) between representatives of the client or between
the client and a representative of the client; or
(5) among lawyers and their representatives





14 Moliterno, supra note 4, at 833. 
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representing the same client.15 
Reasonable minds can and do differ on the appropriate 
scope of the privilege and the utilitarian and rights-based 
theories that have been advanced to support it.  Some critics 
of the privilege have gone so far as to argue for its abolition.  
According to Jeremy Bentham, the result of abolishing the 
attorney-client privilege will not be wrong verdicts but rather 
“[t]hat a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite 
so much assistance from his law adviser, in the way of 
concerting a false defense, as he may do at present.”16 Squared 
off on the other side are John Henry Wigmore and a host of 
others.  Wigmore argued that the entire system benefits when 
attorneys can discuss cases with their clients with complete 
candor, even if the privilege does interfere in some measure 
with the courts’ truth-seeking function.  Even Wigmore 
conceded that the privilege’s “benefits are all indirect and 
speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete.”17 
Some judges consider the privilege so important that they 
refuse to hear from lawyers who are willing to testify regarding 
wrongful convictions, even after their client is dead.18  To a 
large portion of the defense bar, any proposal to limit the 
privilege is the equivalent of heresy.19 
15 UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b). 
16 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO 
ENGLISH PRACTICE 304 (1827). 
17 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (cited in 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE 388 (6th ed. 2006)). 
18 See, e.g., State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976) (holding 
that the privilege could not be abrogated after the client’s death, even where the 
deceased had confessed to his attorney and to law enforcement that he had 
committed the murder for which the defendant had been charged, and his federal 
public defender wanted to come forward to describe his confession).  For an 
extended discussion of the case and the efforts to free Macumber by the Arizona 
Justice Project, see SIEGEL, supra note 10. 
 19 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 
1244 (1991) (quoting nineteenth-century lawyer Henry Lord Brougham in 2 TRIAL 
OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821), quoted in Marvin E. Frankel, The 
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1975)) (“[A]n 
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and expedients, and at 
all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first 
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the 
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty 
of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, 
though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.”); 
Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidences under the A.B.A. Model Rules: 
Ethical Rules Without Ethical Reason, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1984, at 
3; see also Joe Concha, Dershowitz on FBI Raid of Trump Attorney: ‘Dangerous 
Day Today for Lawyer-Client Relations’, THE HILL (Apr. 10, 2018, 11:11 AM), 
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The compromise solution offered in this Essay would 
arguably weaken the privilege in a small handful of cases.  But 
the privilege is far from absolute now.  Most states have 
adopted some version of Model Rule 1.6, which permits 
exceptions for reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm, which some lawyers argue includes instances of 
wrongful incarceration.20  Two states, Alaska and 
Massachusetts, have explicitly recognized an exception for 
preventing wrongful incarceration within their versions of Rule 
1.6.  Massachusetts Rule 1.6(b)(1) states that a lawyer may 
reveal privileged information “to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm, or to prevent the wrongful 
execution or incarceration of another.”21 Comment 6[A] 
provides: “Rule 1.6(b)(1) also permits a lawyer to reveal 
confidential information in the specific situation where such 
information discloses that an innocent person has been 
convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to imprisonment 
or execution.  This language has been included to permit 
disclosure of confidential information in these circumstances 
where the failure to disclose may not involve the commission 
of a crime.”22 
In Alaska, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b) provides: 
A lawyer may reveal a client’s confidence or secret to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain:
(A) death;
(B) substantial bodily harm; or
(C) wrongful execution or incarceration of another[.]23
Most other states have a version of Rule 1.6 that contains some 
form of the Model Rules’ permissive disclosure provision, 
which allows an attorney to come forward based on a 
http://thehill.com/homenews/382453-dershowitz-on-fbi-raid-of-trump-
attorney-dangerous-day-today-for-lawyer-client [https://perma.cc/UH8X-8N3Q] 
(warning that the FBI investigation may erode attorney-client privilege). 
 20 Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be A Wrongful 
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U.L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 391, 392–93, 395–96 (2008) (arguing that states that currently 
have a discretionary disclosure exception for reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm can read an exception for wrongful incarceration 
because of all the potential for bodily harm or death that accompanies 
imprisonment). 
21 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, supra note 9. 
22 Id. at cmt. 6[A]. 
23 ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2018). 
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“reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm.”24 
Permissive grants are not the best option.  Professor 
Moliterno notes that the permissive grant requires significant 
case-by-case balancing regarding the degree of harm caused 
by incarceration and requires judgment calls about whether 
the imprisonment is for a “substantial period.”25 “As currently 
drafted, Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) is a somewhat unwieldy vehicle 
to support a doctrinal path that would allow a defense lawyer 
to remedy a wrongful conviction of another.”26  He contrasts 
the Model Rule with the categorical approach in the Alaska and 
Massachusetts rules, which allow permissive reporting of 
wrongful conviction.  “The Alaska and Massachusetts 
approach is cleaner but still requires what may be unpalatable 
to some: Inflicting harm on one’s own client to aid an innocent 
other.”27  That concern for the lawyer’s current client is real 
and for many lawyers would be an absolute barrier to coming 
forward to help the wrongfully convicted.  As Coventry said 
when asked about the Logan case, “I could not figure out a 
way, and still cannot figure out a way, how we could have done 
anything to help Alton Logan that would not have put Andrew 
Wilson in jeopardy of another capital case.”28  Forcing lawyers 
to choose between harming their client and helping an 
innocent creates a moral quandary, and permissive statutes 
and rules do not resolve it. 
Though the foregoing discussion was focused on utilitarian 
arguments for the proposal, other claims about the privilege 
are rights-based.  These argue that the Sixth Amendment 
provides for an unqualified privilege that may not be abridged 
by statute.  My answer to those critiques is that that ship has 
sailed.  Once one looks at all of the attorney-protecting 
exceptions in Rule 1.6, it is clear that we do not have a true 
rights-based model.  Those wedded to a view that the 
attorney-client privilege is an essential individual human right, 
maintaining an essential separation between the individual 
and the state, will be unlikely to support any version, with or 
without the immunity grant.29 
III 
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, supra note 5. 
25 Moliterno, supra note 4, at 828. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 832–33. 
28 See 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison, supra note 1. 
29 See MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 388–90 (discussing the bases for the 
privilege). 
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HOW THE PROPOSAL DIFFERS FROM CURRENT LAW 
The proposal as drafted would make significant changes to 
current law.  Like the Alaska and Massachusetts rules, which 
permit attorneys to reveal client confidences to remedy cases 
of wrongful conviction, my proposed statute similarly removes 
the balancing of harms required under the Model Rule.  But it 
also differs from the more permissive versions of Rule 1.6 
adopted in Alaska and Massachusetts in two important ways. 
First, it does away with the unpalatable—and quite frankly for 
many defense attorneys absolutely foregone—choice between 
harming one’s client and seeking justice for the wrongfully 
convicted person.  Second, it is mandatory as proposed, 
although it may be more acceptable to some if it were optional. 
I will address these drafting choices in turn.  Additionally, it 
applies to a subset of the wrongfully convicted, to minimize the 
impact.  As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the 
proposed rule only applies post-conviction where someone is 
sentenced to incarceration for more than a year, so the 
concerns about group criminal activity with designated 
immunized “no-fall” guys is somewhat alleviated, and the 
perjury temptations that now exist in instances of organized 
crime will not be significantly rebalanced. 
A. Immunity as a Legislative Choice
As noted, the proposal is significant because it statutorily
creates a mandatory grant of use and derivative use immunity 
for the client who has confessed to their lawyer.30  Use 
immunity would mean that the attorney’s report of his client’s 
statements could never be used in connection with the crime 
to which they had credibly confessed.  The proposal could work 
with no such grant, or with a broader transactional immunity 
grant.  I arrived at use and derivative use immunity for two 
reasons.  I believe that the state-bar politics surrounding the 
proposed change are far more likely to receive support on both 
sides when the defense receives a benefit of equal or greater 
value than the privilege it is being asked to yield.  I also believe 
that without it, many defense attorneys would be 
noncompliant.  Immunity is necessary to get defense attorneys 
to come forward, because criminal defense lawyers are unlikely 
to reveal their clients’ confidences when they know it will 
expose the client to criminal prosecution and other potential 
harms, notwithstanding personal moral qualms regarding the 
 30 In discussions with prosecutors, this feature is usually vehemently 
resisted. 
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wrongful conviction of others.31  Moreover, I concede that 
knowing that such confidences might be revealed will in fact 
have some marginal detrimental effect on a client’s willingness 
to be completely candid with his or her lawyers; but 
confidences can already be revealed for a multitude of reasons, 
and I do not believe the marginal effects outweigh the potential 
benefits.32 
B. Mandatory Reporting
The benefit that we as a society gain in exchange for the
immunity grant is a mandatory reporting regime.  Lawyers will 
be required to come forward with the confession information 
once they become aware that someone factually innocent has 
been convicted and their client has credibly confessed33 to 
being the actual perpetrator.  As drafted, they shall file the 
affidavit detailing the information.  Other writers, such as 
Hasbani for example, suggest a permissive reporting scheme 
and would trigger the right to report a client confession at 
wrongful incarceration.34  A permissive approach would leave 
it up to individual defense attorneys to decide for themselves 
whether to come forward.  I believe that the permissive 
approach would not solve the public trust problems that the 
withholding of information creates and would leave the range 
of attorney-client disclosures that would go with such a rule so 
unpredictable as to offer cold comfort to those committed to 
the truth.  Moreover, the permissive approach could 
conceivably encourage attorneys to gain a competitive 
advantage by claiming to offer the more impenetrable version 
of the privilege to their clients. 
My proposal places significant weight on remedying 
wrongful convictions.  It is premised on the belief that it is more 
 31 The client could face civil liability, reputational damage, or lose the right 
to vote, lose a job (felon-restricted positions), or lose the right to many classes of 
government benefits, among other things. 
32 See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, When the State Demands Disclosure, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 675, 720–21 (2011) (“[E]nforcing disclosure statutes against attorneys
gives clients a reason to restrict communication with their own counsel,
undermining the effectiveness of their assistance.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Child
Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the
Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L. J. 203, 277 (1992) (“[T]he net loss of
[confession] information occasioned by the [attorney-client] privilege is relatively
minimal as it is the privilege’s very promise of confidentiality that encourages the
initial candid and damaging revelation.”).
33 Attorneys who are opposed to this kind of reporting may very well find that 
the confession is not “credible.”  I leave the fine-tuning of such determinations to 
case-by-case decisions. 
34 See Hasbani, supra note 4, at 297–98. 
2018] IMMUNITY AS A STATUTORY SOLUTION   13 
important to overturn a wrongful conviction than to convict the 
guilty party.  This intuition has a long history, embodied in the 
maxim that it is better that ten guilty people go free than that 
one innocent person be convicted.35  It also recognizes that it 
is significantly unlikely that an accurate conviction will 
ultimately be achieved when someone has already been 
wrongfully convicted for the crime.  So, on one side of the 
equation we have the opportunity to free a wrongfully convicted 
innocent person, and on the other we have the cost to the state 
and to the victims of further reducing the already massively 
discounted opportunity to convict the factually guilty. 
IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The proposed statute is constitutional.  The attorney-client 
privilege itself is a product of state law, not a constitutional 
mandate.  Both immunity grants and mandatory reporting of 
client confidences by attorneys have been upheld in other 
contexts. 
Kastigar immunity—a form of use and derivative use 
immunity—has been an accepted part of federal trial practice 
for decades.36  In a different context, challenges to mandatory 
child-abuse reporting statutes in Texas and Oklahoma, which 
explicitly narrowed the attorney-client privilege to require 
lawyers to come forward, have also established that 
shall-report statutes pass constitutional muster.  As Professor 
Frank Bowman has noted, “the privilege itself is not 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, either under the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel or under the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.  The fact that 
courts have created a zone of privilege to protect the 
attorney-client relationship gives the privilege itself no 
independent constitutional status.”37 Likewise, the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments apply only when testimony is being 
compelled and after the initiation of formal adversarial criminal 
proceedings, respectively.38 
35 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352. 
 36 For a much broader discussion of the issue, see generally Mosteller, supra 
note 32; see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 459–62 (1972) (holding 
that the government may grant use and derivative use immunity and compel a 
witness to testify before the grand jury, consonant with the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee against self-incrimination). 
37 Frank O. Bowman III, A Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of 
Ethical Rules against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 665, 688 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
38 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[No person] shall be compelled in any criminal 
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Much of the discussion in the law review literature has 
been driven by the Supreme Court cases of Swidler & Berlin v. 
United States, which confirmed that the attorney-client 
privilege extends beyond death,39 and Fisher v. United States, 
which examined the relationship between client and attorney 
in a Fifth Amendment context and held that documents were 
not covered by attorney-client privilege simply because they 
had been transferred to an attorney.40 These cases, as well as 
numerous other lower-court cases, have examined questions 
related to the matter of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
implications of revealing client wrongdoing.41 Most of the 
scholarship in the area suggests that client confidences could 
be revealed, at least under certain circumstances, without 
violating either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. 
On one side of the debate are scholars such as my 
colleague, Robert Mosteller, who stated: 
[I]f the privilege were changed by legislative action prior to
the client’s consultation to eliminate the guarantee of
confidentiality upon which the defendant may have relied,
it is difficult to find much in the theory of the Fifth
Amendment, or due process for that matter, that would
render the legislative action unconstitutional.42
However, Mosteller notes, if the attorney used some form of a 
promise that the information would not be used by the attorney 
to obtain the incriminating information, this could be viewed 
as coercion and, as such, a violation of the client’s due process 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal 
prosecutions . . . .”). 
39 See 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998). 
40 See 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976). 
 41 See, e.g., United States v. Amlani, 169 F.3d 1189, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that defendant waived attorney-client privilege where defendant brought 
Sixth Amendment attorney disparagement claim); Foster v. Hill (In re Foster), 188 
F.3d 1259, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Under Fisher, however, [the attorney-client]
privilege effectively incorporates a client’s Fifth Amendment right; it prevents the
court from forcing [an attorney] to produce documents given it by [a client] in
seeking legal advice if the Amendment would bar the court from forcing [the
client] himself to produce those documents.”); United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d
82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Schmidt’s new attorney Cohen twice stated in her presence
that he believed [her former attorney’s] testimony might be necessary to decide
her Sixth Amendment claim.  She therefore either impliedly waived the
attorney-client privilege or consented, by her silence, to disclosure.”); United
States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that attorneys could
not assert a client’s Fifth Amendment privilege where the Internal Revenue
Service sought testimony and production relating to the tax liability of the
attorney’s client).
42 Mosteller, supra note 32, at 270. 
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rights.43 
[A] legislature could constitutionally eliminate the
protections of the attorney-client privilege except when
criminal litigation has been formally initiated.  This
statement may seem shocking, suggesting an unrealistic,
apocalyptic result, but to the contrary is based on
uncontroversial constitutional interpretation.  The
attorney-client privilege as it applies to . . . testimony by an
attorney against the (former) client depends largely upon the
good judgment of legislatures and their determination of
sound social policy.44
On the other side of the debate is Monroe Freedman, who 
believes the privilege is constitutionally required.  In his view, 
even the current permissive reporting requirements under the 
Model Rules are unconstitutional.  According to Freedman, 
“the sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination have been 
inextricably linked with the lawyer-client privilege as 
constitutional expressions of the adversary system.  The Model 
Rules, with their assault on confidentiality, attack the 
adversary system and therefore the Constitution.”45 
I agree with Mosteller that there are no Fifth Amendment 
barriers to the use of a “shall-report” formulation.  There is no 
constitutionally significant difference from schemes that 
provide that those attorneys with more robust consciences 
may disclose.  Is there state coercion inherent in requiring 
reporting that runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment?  The 
statutory grant of immunity from prosecution undercuts those 
Fifth Amendment objections.  Because immunity obviates 
criminal prosecution, a state requirement to come forward will 
not require statements to be made “in any criminal case.”46 
Moreover, other cases demonstrate that use immunity, 
which would prevent the government from using the evidence 
of the guilty client’s confession in any subsequent trial, but 
would not preclude the government from initiating an 
investigation from that testimony, appears to be all that is 
constitutionally required.47 
In addition to the Fifth Amendment concerns, there are 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 271–72 (footnotes omitted). 
45 Monroe H. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 685, 690 (1981)
46 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
47 Derivative-use has been upheld in cases such as Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
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potential Sixth Amendment concerns if the proposal unduly 
interferes with the defendant’s right to counsel.  As noted by 
Professor Tremblay in his examination of mandatory reporting 
regimes implicating attorneys in a different context, 
[t]he three Sixth Amendment concerns are ineffective
assistance of counsel, government intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship, and conflict of interest.  These
arguments only come into play, however, where the
government has interfered with the lawyer who is defending
the accused on the charge which is the subject of the Sixth
Amendment claim.48
Professor Aviel notes that: “A statute that requires an 
attorney to disclose information about unindicted offenses 
does not violate a client’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
unless it deprives him of effective assistance for the charges 
already filed against him.”49 Moreover, conduct that follows the 
ethical rules is considered effective, even in those instances 
where the privilege is implicated. 
In Swidler, which upheld a posthumous attorney-client 
privilege, Justice O’Connor considered the situation at issue in 
this article when she wrote in dissent: 
[T]he costs of recognizing an absolute posthumous privilege
can be inordinately high.  Extreme injustice may occur, for
example, where a criminal defendant seeks disclosure of a
deceased client’s confession to the offense.  In my view, the
paramount value that our criminal justice system places on
protecting an innocent defendant should outweigh a
deceased client’s interest in preserving confidences.  . . . I
do not believe that the attorney-client privilege should act
as an absolute bar to the disclosure of a deceased client’s
communications.  When the privilege is asserted in the
criminal context, and a showing is made that the
communications at issue contain necessary factual
information not otherwise available, courts should be
permitted to assess whether interests in fairness and
accuracy outweigh the justifications for the privilege.50
O’Connor’s considerations were practical, not constitutional, 
but she, too, saw no constitutional bar to limiting the privilege. 
As the foregoing shows, the components of this proposal, 
both immunity grants and mandatory reporting of client 
 48 Paul R. Tremblay, “Ratting,” 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC., 49, 66–67 (1993) 
(footnotes omitted). 
49 Aviel, supra note 32, at 708 (emphasis omitted). 
 50 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 413–14 (1998) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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In this section, I briefly consider some of the practical 
considerations below to give the reader some sense of the 
problems to be considered.  The proposal will only succeed if 
the practical concerns that lawyers may have, as prosecutors, 
defense counsel, or external critics of the system, are met in a 
manner in which the predictable costs, both administratively 
and in potential new inaccuracies, are considered. 
A. Prosecution-Side Objections
The most significant objection to the proposal is perhaps
the risk of false confessions by collusive cohorts of the 
convicted person.52  Individuals may be tempted to falsely 
confess to having committed a crime for which a friend, 
relative, or criminal associate was convicted, seeking to receive 
a grant of immunity and get the friend or relative out of prison 
via their false confession.  While it is entirely conceivable that 
someone might be tempted to tell such a lie, the proposal 
retains a couple of safeguards.  First, a lawyer is required to 
act as an intermediary for the grant of immunity to be 
available.  Attorneys will be subject to ethical limitations that 
place their professional livelihood in jeopardy if they engage in 
a fraud on the court.  The falsely confessing cohort can be 
prosecuted under the various perjury and 
false-claims-to-law-enforcement statutes that are already on 
the books in most jurisdictions.  Any state considering 
adopting the proposal should take a close look at the charges 
available to prosecutors to ensure that they adequately cover 
the risk of false confession, without unduly suppressing true 
claims.  Additionally, the grant of immunity for a crime that 
the collusive cohort did not commit will cost the system time 
to sort out but is not in itself a guarantee that an actually guilty 
defendant will be released.  The proposal is designed to bring 
new information into the system that was previously 
unavailable.  It in no way prescribes an outcome.  A truly 
persuasive false confession is possible, of course, but in my 
view, the upside outweighs the risk. 
51 See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
 52 See Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as 
Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1382–85 (1996). 
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It is also possible that creating the mechanism will permit 
false confessions by an innocent person in the first instance, 
for the purpose of engineering a future grant of immunity to 
the actual perpetrator.  This is the problem typified by the mob 
or gang member “fall guy.”  A demonstrably innocent person 
falsely confesses and is wrongfully convicted.  It is only then 
that the truly guilty actor comes forward and confesses to his 
attorney, provides the alibi evidence for the wrongfully 
convicted party, and seeks immunity under the statute.  If the 
innocent defendant who is incarcerated falsely confessed in 
collusion with a third party for the purpose of obstructing a 
prosecution of the truly guilty, perjury, obstruction of justice, 
and fraud charges would remain available to the prosecution. 
There are other possible practical objections.  Some might 
be wary that the new mechanism will open the courthouse 
doors to a torrent of false confessions because it introduces a 
costless form of collateral attack.  Others might fear that the 
defense bar will collude with such confessions to muddy the 
waters.  Law enforcement and prosecutors might object to the 
loss of the opportunity to prosecute the actual guilty party 
because of the grant of immunity.  Finally, there may be a 
concern that joint defense agreements will create the 
opportunity for well-insulated and carefully crafted assaults on 
the integrity of the process.  Given these concerns, I expect the 
courts to be rightfully skeptical when determining whose 
confessions should be believed and whose convictions should 
be overturned.  I would also expect the participants in the 
system to pay close attention to false confessions because 
those who tender them should be convicted of obstruction of 
justice. 
Some prosecutors to whom I have described the proposal 
say they would oppose any grant of immunity unless they knew 
precisely what the witness had to say.  Granting the power to 
make that decision to a judge and a defense attorney while 
cutting out the prosecution raises questions about the 
separation of powers.  By removing the executive branch or the 
elected prosecutor from the immunity conversation, the court 
risks making an ill-informed decision.  Structuring the statute 
to grant use immunity rather than transactional immunity 
would be one way to address this particular concern. 
Finally, there are concerns regarding separation of powers 
and the retention of executive prerogatives belonging to the 
prosecutor.  In states where the roles of elected prosecutors or 
attorneys general are defined by the state constitution, the 
proposal may raise state constitutional considerations. 
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B. Defense-Side Objections
There is no doubt that the proposal may tend to alter the
nature of attorney-client discussions if adopted.  This is a 
necessary cost if we are going to make this information 
available.  As the Court noted in Fisher: 
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging 
information could more readily be obtained from the 
attorney following disclosure than from himself in the 
absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to 
confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully 
informed legal advice.53 
The proposal does have the potential to alter the nature of the 
attorney-client relationship by requiring a somewhat more 
robust disclosure discussion between client and counsel.  I 
sincerely doubt whether much discussion takes place now, 
notwithstanding all the attorney-protective exceptions to the 
privilege contained in the current version of Rule 1.6.  From 
what I have been able to ascertain so far, few problems are 
reported with criminal practice in Alaska and Massachusetts 
under their versions of the rule, which permit, but do not 
require, reporting in wrongful conviction cases now.  While the 
nature of disclosures made to the client has apparently not 
changed that much under permissive rules, it is possible that 
a mandatory reporting rule might change that.54 
There is a risk that defense counsel who are hostile to the 
reporting obligation and want to be seen as strongly 
pro-defendant will give an even broader version of what is 
referred to in some defense circles as “the speech”: coaching 
clients not to confess to anything but to speak in hypotheticals 
only.  Any change in the system is unlikely to reach those 
lawyers anyway.  They prioritize other commitments over 
accurate outcomes. 
There are also possible defense objections from a slightly 
different angle.  A witness who might be inclined to come 
forward from a moral obligation, particularly in 
multi-defendant cases where there may be someone who is 
innocent swept up with the guilty, may decide that it is now in 
his or her best interest to delay, because he or she can wait to 
see if there is a conviction before coming forward.  Because 
staging the decision to come forward will depend on who is 
tried first, the proposal has the potential to create some new 
53 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 54 See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer 
Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 97 (1994). 
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and awkward versions of the prisoners’ dilemma.  A defendant 
must be wrongfully convicted and the witness not yet convicted 
for the incentive structure to work, so guilty parties in joint 
trials or reverse-order scenarios will not receive the same 
benefits for true exculpatory testimony.  The potential windfall 
to the guilty who happen to be tried second is an additional 
cost created by the proposal. 
C. Institutional Cost Objections
If there is an additional path to unwinding verdicts,
prosecutors and judges may fear that the proposal will open a 
floodgate of collateral attacks on convictions.  Even if there is 
a screen for removing false confessions, the rise in litigation, 
especially from pro se litigants who are not subject to bar 
discipline, may create a new burden for already overtaxed 
prosecutors’ offices and for trial court chambers. 
Is this objection well-founded?  Will this proposal open 
floodgates to post-conviction challenges?  I think that having 
two gatekeepers—defense counsel who will not be motivated to 
come forward unless it is actually necessary and courts who 
will be interested in preserving accurate convictions—will act 
to limit the number of cases where this will apply.  However, 
the net benefits in terms of overturning wrongful convictions 
will exceed the marginal additional litigation we can expect to 
see.  Ex parte, in camera review will cost some time for defense 
counsel and the court, and in the cohort of credible cases, may 
lead to significant new litigation.55 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed statute trades two significant losses—a false 
conviction and a free and unsuspected perpetrator—for a 
single one, an identified and immunized perpetrator.  The 
release of an innocent person and greater care for the 
truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system result. 
The legislation this Essay proposes has the potential to relieve 
a serious problem, the wrongful conviction of an innocent 
 55 There are other second-order effects of immunity that might apply.  For 
example, depending on statutory compensation schemes, possible civil damages 
that were paid by a wrongfully convicted individual to a victim may have to be 
paid instead by the State (if, under the new scheme, the true perpetrator is 
immune from civil liability); marginal harms to the “system” may be perceived 
when the perpetrator, in “getting away” with a felony, will still have the right to 
vote, own firearms, and hold restricted jobs (including some government jobs or 
potentially serve in the military); and dangerous people may not have to register 
as sex-offenders, if they are immunized from civil liability as well. 
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person.  It creates an incentive for true perpetrators to come 
forward to right the wrong and a mechanism whereby 
conscientious defense counsel can simultaneously serve their 
client and the interests of justice.  The new regime would be 
administrable without overwhelming costs, and the judges and 
lawyers who would be tasked with making it work are certainly 
capable of doing so.  Right now, the system is absorbing two 
wrongs—an innocent convicted and a guilty perpetrator 
avoiding justice.  Under the new system, that cost is halved at 
the very least.  If we really believe that a wrongful conviction is 
significantly worse than a missed conviction, then the scales 
tip much further in favor of implementing the proposal.  There 
is some collateral risk to defendants who might not be as 
willing to confess the full course of their activities to their 
attorneys if they know the attorney-client privilege is not 
absolute.  However, I believe that the risk is overstated and is 
more likely to be a concern for defense counsel who like the 
current rule than it is for defendants, who will be far less 
attuned to the nuance of the privilege.  As it now stands, the 
privilege is not absolute, and any current claims to the 
contrary by defense counsel would be misleading.  False 
confessions are possible, but they need not be believed, and 
perjury charges await lying confessors who seek to wrongfully 
undermine existing verdicts. 
Additionally, this Essay is a proposal and will benefit from 
full discussion by the bench and the bar, airing concerns from 
both the defense and the prosecution.  Ultimately, if the 
proposal frees innocent people who have been wrongfully 
convicted, the risks raised by objectors seem to be a price 
worth paying.  On balance, then, creating an opportunity for a 
perpetrator to come forward and seek an ex parte, in camera 
review of his confession, followed by a grant of use and 
derivative use, or even transactional immunity, will solve more 
and worse problems than it creates.  It is, I submit, a step 
worth taking. 
